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THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF JOB OPENINGS AVAILABLE TO MR. 
COLBURN UTILIZING HIS SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE. IF THE 
COURT IMPUTES INCOME TO MR. COLBURN IT SHOULD BE CALCULATED 
AT $23,000 WHICH IS THE HIGHEST JOB OFFER RECEIVED OR 
$26,600 WHICH IS THE SALARY FOR STARTING FINANCIAL PLANNERS. 
Both briefs filed in this action cite Hall v. Hall, 858 P. 2d 1018 
(Utah App. 1993) for the legal principal that a finding of voluntary 
underemployment must be based on Mr. Colburn's abilities, employment 
capacity, earning potential and possible job openings available. Mrs. 
Romboy testified that Mr. Colburn had abilities and skills that could 
be transferred to employment as either a public relations manager or 
management consultant. However, there was no testimony presented at 
trial that there were job openings available in either of these 
fields. Further, it is mere conjecture that Mr. Colburn who was 
fifty-one years of age and without experience in these areas could 
land a job in either public relations or management consulting. 
A review of Respondent's brief gives an inaccurate and distorted 
picture of the efforts made by Mr. Colburn to secure employment after 
being forced to resign from Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters. 
There are a number of representations that are either taken out of 
context or do not provide a complete picture. Paragraph 12 of 
Respondent's Statement of Facts provides: 
12. After resigning from Southern Marine and Aviation 
Underwriters, Defendant contacted three (3) or four (4) 
individuals, and attended one (1) interviews seeking 
employment. (Tr. 39, 94) 
Page 39 of the transcript relied on for the foregoing paragraph 
provides: 
Q (By Mr. Anderson) To the best of your knowledge did he 
attempt to find full-time employment after resigning from 
Southern Marine and Aviation? 
A (Mrs. Colburn) Well, he initially made some calls around 
the country. We took sort of a driving vacation in the 
southeast and he went to Atlanta, talked with a company 
there, but to my knowledge that's the only actual interview 
he had. And he had it in his mind that he really wasn't 
going to work, he was going to start his own business. 
Mrs. Colburn's self-serving testimony completely ignores the 
testimony of Mr. Colburn that he spent months seeking employment both 
in and outside of the aviation insurance industry. Mr. Colburn 
testified he contacted head hunters, all of his previous contacts and 
six or seven companies within the aviation industry and there were no 
employment offers for senior aviation insurance underwriters. (Tr. 
93,96,97; R.212 f 8 FOF). 
Page 94 of the transcript is also relied on to support paragraph 
12 of Respondent's Statement of Facts. On page 94 there is a 
reference to three or four individuals Mr. Colburn contacted that had 
contacts with reinsurance treaties. As set forth above, these people 
are not the only individuals contacted by Mr. Colburn for employment. 
Paragraph 13 of Mrs. Colburn's Statement of Facts provides: 
13. Defendant declined to seek employment in other areas 
of the insurance business, and turned down two (2) job 
offers. (Tr. 98). 
Mr. Colburn sought employment in areas other than aviation 
insurance or he would have not contacted the Marine division of 
Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters or New York Life and I.D.S. 
for employment. The two job offers turned down were $13,000 a year 
for New York Life and $23,000 per year for I.D.S.. (Tr. 90,98; R. 212 
f 8 FOF). 
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Paragraph 14 of Respondent's Statement of Facts states: 
14. Defendant declined to seek employment outside of his 
specific areas of expertise in the aviation insurance 
industry, desiring instead to start his own business as a 
financial planner in Park City. (Tr. 98,99,100,101). 
As set forth above, Mr. Colburn sought employment outside of the 
aviation insurance industry. There were areas of employment he did 
not consider for various reasons. He did not consider the automobile 
insurance business because he would have to learn a whole new trade 
and in the long term he could make more money as a financial planner. 
He did not consider becoming a pilot because he had not flown an 
airplane for fifteen years and he was not aware of any jobs other than 
flying co-pilot which would earn less than $20,000 per year. (Tr. 98-
101) . 
Paragraph 18 in Respondent's Statement of Facts provides: 
18. Defendant was requested by the President of VEMCO to 
head up its commercial department. (Tr. 180). 
Page 180 of the Transcript provides: 
Q (by Mr. Anderson) You stated when you were let go from 
National Underwriters that you weren't— you couldn't find 
another position. Isn't it true that you were offered a 
position with VEMCO in Frederick, Maryland? 
A (Mr. Colburn) Yeah, but I don't think — the chairman 
just said that he wanted me to head up the commercial 
department, which was going backwards, and it was just 
something he said I think to appease me. There was no 
actual job offer. (Emphasis added). 
Paragraph 19 of Mrs. Colburn's Statement of Facts provides: 
19. Defendant testified that he did not look for 
employment in other areas of the insurance industry because 
he was tired of getting bumped out of the corporate jobs. 
(Tr. 180). 
Mr. Colburn looked for employment in aviation and other areas of 
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the insurance industry. Mr. Colburn did testify he was "tired of 
getting bumped out of these corporate jobs". However, this statement 
refers to his being terminated as an aviation insurance executive with 
both National Aviation Underwriters and Southern Marine and Aviation 
Underwriters. It does not mean Mr. Colburn wasn't attempting to seek 
other employment. 
The body of Respondent's Brief also distorts the facts of the 
case. Page 22 and 23 of Respondent's brief provides: 
The similarity between the facts in Hill and the case at 
bar are striking. In justifying his decision to become a 
self-employed financial planner earning $260.00 per month, 
Defendant continually asserted he chose to do so because 
that is where his education and interests lie. (Tr. 180). 
This choice was made at the expense of the opportunity to 
make a higher salary in a job less related to his expressed 
desire to become a fee-only financial planner. While Mr. 
Colburn is free to make such a personal decision, in light 
of the ruling in Hill, his personal preferences should not 
undermine his obligations to support Mrs. Colburn. 
In Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah App. 1993), the husband quit 
his job at Morton Thiokol and obtained employment in Utah County at 
a substantial decrease in salary. Mr. Colburn did not quit his 
employment with either National Aviation Underwriters or Southern 
Marine and Aviation Underwriters. He was terminated by both employers 
as a result of the contracting aviation industry. Mr. Colburn chose 
to become a certified financial planner (CFP) because there were no 
jobs available in aviation insurance and he felt financial planning 
provided the best long-term employment prospects available. 
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, Mr. Colburn's 
position as set forth in Appellant's Brief is that he is not 
voluntarily underemployed and the court pursuant to Section 78-45-
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7.5(7) (a) is not authorized to impute income. However, should the 
court determir * ome should be i mpti! "' I ti'i 'In1 purposes of 
calculating alimony, the court should use $23,000 per year which is 
the highest job offer received by Mr. Colburn, or $10.00 per hour 
(approximately $21, 0 0 0 per year) based < ::n I ! l:t ::' : •] 1: u n i i f s testimony that 
he could earn $10.00 per year working for another financial planner. 
(Tr. 156) The maximum amount of income the court is justified in 
imput ing test imony o f Co i :ii i i e Romboy i s 
$26,600 per year which is her testimony of the salary for a beginning 
financial planner in the State of Utah. (Tr. 128). 
POINT II. 
THE ALIMONY AWARD TO MRS. COLBURN CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION WHETHER OR NOT INCOME IS IMPUTED TO MR. COLBURN 
BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN UNEQUAL POST-DIVORCE LIVING STANDARDS. 
As set forth in Point II of Appellant's Brief, alimony should 
seek to the extent possible I: : eqi la ] i ze the parties1 respective post-
divorce living standards. However, alimony may only raise the 
standard of living of the receiving spouse unti] it is roughly equal 
I I In ill 'it I IIH 11 in HI spouse. Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P. 2d 1331 (Utah 
App. 1988), Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App 1991) The 
alimony award in this case results in disproportionate standards of 
living I i Ml i | i.nr I; I < »S nven if Mi, Colburn is imputed income at 
$40,000 per year. 
Both parties agree that Mrs. Colburn has gross monthly resources 
of $4,729 Colburn claims that using $40,0™ 
year or $3,333.33 per month in imputed income, his gross monthly 




$3,333.33 Imputed Income 
1,125.00 Non-IRA earnings 
306.10 ULTRA earnings 
$4,764.43 TOTAL 
In Respondent's Brief it is alleged that Mr. Colburn has gross 
monthly resources of $5,028.43 which is $264.00 more than that claimed 
by Mr. Colburn. The $264.00 difference is assumed to be Mr. Colburn's 
earnings from Summit Financial Advisors Group. It is clearly improper 
to add the $264.00 per month actual earnings to the $3,333.33 imputed 
income. Accordingly, Mrs. Colburn's actual monthly resources is only 
$35.00 less than Mr. Colburnfs monthly resources using imputed monthly 
earnings of $3,333.33. 
While the parties resources using imputed income for Mr. Colburn 
are similar, there is a tremendous disparity in the standard of living 
of the parties as evidenced by their claimed expenses. Mrs. Colburn's 
expenses total $3,906.30 whereas Mr. Colburn's expenses total 
$2,179.00 per month which includes a $704.00 child support obligation. 
When child support is factored out, Mr. Colburn lives on $1,475.00 per 
month. 
A comparison of some of the expenses of the parties clearly 
establishes the disproportionate living standards: 
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Expense Mrs. Colburn Mr. Colburn 
Rent or Mortgage payment $1,500 $400 
Food & household supplies $ 600 $2 00 
Entertainment $ 600 $2 00 
Auto expense $ 200 $150 
School $ 350 $0 
the five it*Mir IHT tru In ibmi , iu i. i DM MI s expenses are 
$2,300.00 more than Mr. Colburn. These expenses reflect a substantial 
difference in standard of living relating to housing, food, 
entertainment and educat ire is oi LI y a $50 difference in 
auto expense, it should be noted that Mr. Colburn's auto expenses are 
less for his 1982 Volvo than Mrs. Colburn incurs for her 1993 Subaru. 
While Mrs. Colburnfs living expenses she 1i1d be somewhat higher 
inasmuch as she is the custodial parent for the two minor children, 
there is no justification for a discrepancy in living expenses of 
$2,431. I Itrther, as noted in footnote 4 Respondent's Brief, 
the parties' oldest child attained 18 years of age and graduated from 
high school in June, 1995 which further reduces Mrs. colburn's 
househo1d expense. 
Respondent argues that with $3,3 30 imputed monthly income to Mr. 
Colburn, he is able to pay his expenses, including alimony, ai I 
maintain aboi I he same positive cash flow as Mrs. Colburn ($1,849.43 
vs. $1,823.00). This argument fails to take into consideration that 
Mr. Colburn's ability to generate gross monthly income as calculated 
by Respondent the standard of living of the 
parties is not equal, Mr. Colburn should not be penalized nor Mrs. 
Colburn rewarded because Mr. Colburn's living expenses are $2,431.30 
I >e. i lie )i I t .1 ( $3,906.30 less $1,475) less than Mrs. Colburn's, Further, 
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if Mr. Colburn is imputed income at $26,600 year or $2,217 per month 
(see Point I, supra), his gross monthly imputed resources of $3,648 
are $1,081 less than Mrs. Colburn1s actual gross monthly resources 
exclusive of alimony. 
Respondent's Brief indicates that Mrs. Colburn's monthly expenses 
"did not include amounts normally used for regular savings and family 
vacations, which had been substantial in the past." Mr. Colburn's 
expenses also do not include regular savings or vacations. Without 
taking into consideration the alimony award, Mr. Colburn has a 
negative cash flow of $484.00 per month while Mrs. Colburn has a 
positive cash flow of $823.00 per month. Mrs. Colburn also argues 
that her positive cash flow of $823.00 per month completely ignores 
all tax consequences and her regular taxes and deductions consume her 
positive cash flow. If the court takes into consideration taxes, it 
should consider tax consequences to both parties. As set forth on 
page 20 of Appellant's Brief, Mr. Colburn is required to earn 
$80,311.58 per year just to meet his financial obligations of 
$3,179.00 (includes alimony) per month when taxes are taken into 
consideration. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROVIDED SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO CALCULATE MR. COLBURN'S RETIREMENT 
BENEFITS UNDER THE NAVY POINT SYSTEM. THE NAVY 
POINT SYSTEM IS CONSISTENT WITH WOODWARD. 
In Respondent's Brief it is alleged there was insufficient 
evidence presented at trial for the court to determine that the true 
value of Mr. Colburn's retirement is measured by the Navy point system 
and the court was without a reliable means of determining how to 
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translate the accrued points into a set monetary value. This position 
fails onsideration the rt's admission of Exhibit 2 0 
and receipt of a copy of In Re Marriage of Poppe, 97 Cal.App.3d 1, 158 
Cal.Rptr. 500 (1979). With respect to admission of Exhibit 20, the 
transcript j: ro1 n i • ies : 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: We would renew our admission for Exhibit 
20. 
THE COURT: All right. I am going to allow admission of D-
20 and as to what weight would be my determination 
regarding whether— what weight and to the applicable law 
in effect. (Tr. 117) 
During closing arguments, the navy point system and the Poppe 
decision were specifically argued (Tr. 212-214). Mr, Colburn's 
counsel argued * part as follows: 
Now the benefits accrued during the marriage in terms of 
Navy retirement are the points that Mr. Colburn receives 
from the U.S. Navy. And those points are set forth on 
Exhibit 20, a letter from the U.S. Navy. And she [Mrs. 
Colburn] is certainly entitled to one-half of the benefits 
that Mr. Colburn receives for retirement during the 21-year 
marriage. 
Now the fact of it is he was on active duty before their 
marriage and she is not entitled to those points, based 
upon the Poppe decision I provided to the Court. I don't 
find anything, you Honor, inconsistent with Poppe and 
Woodward. 
If evidence regarding the naval point system had not been 
introduced at trial, Mrs. Colburn1s attorney would certainly have 
objected to the foregoing argument am /e 
allowed the same. 
Application of the naval point system is consistent with 
Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P. 2d 43 ' ' \ 1982)- Woodward speci fi caJ ] y 
provides with respect to retirement benefits that "to the extent that 
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the right has so accrued it is subject to equitable distribution". 
656 P. 2d at 433. Over sixty percent of Mr. Colburn's retirement 
benefits accrued prior to marriage when Mr. Colburn was on active 
duty. Accordingly, Mrs. Colburn is not entitled to the benefits which 
Mr. Colburn accrued prior to marriage. Based on the evidence 
presented during trial, Mrs. Colburn's retirement award is computed 
by multiplying one-half times the fraction 939/2409 times the amount 
of the pension or 19.5% of Mr. Colburn's Navy retirement. This 
information was available to the trial court and is consistent with 
the Woodward decision. 
POINT IV 
MR. COLBURN HAS SATISFACTORILY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE 
RELATING TO THE ISSUE OF VOLUNTARY UNDEREMPLOYMENT. 
Point I of Respondent's Brief contends that Mr. Colburn has 
failed to satisfactorily marshall the evidence relating to the issue 
of voluntarily underemployment. Specifically, it is alleged that 
there was a failure to marshall the evidence in the following areas: 
(1) Omission of Mr. Colburn's position as a high level 
executive during most of his career, serving as President 
and C.E.O. National Aviation Underwriters from 1986 through 
1988 and Vice-President Southern Marine Aviation and 
Underwriters from 1988 through 1992; 
(2) Failure to note Connie Romboy's testimony that it is 
essential to look at the transferability and marketability 
of skills obtained as a result of defendant's employment as 
a high level executive to accurately determine what he 
might make in the current labor market; 
(3) Failure to note that Mr. Colburn declined to accept 
employment outside of the aviation insurance industry and 
that he was asked to head of the commercial department of 
VEMCO; and, 
(4) Failure to refer to evidence of career possibilities 
that exist outside of operating his own business including 
employment as a pilot and other opportunities inside the 
field of financial planning. 
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A careful review of Mr. Colburn's Brief reflects that each of the 
foregoing alleged omissions were addressed in Appellant's brief. 
Past Employment. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the Statement of Facts 
in Appellant's Brief clearly set forth that Mr. Colburn worked for 
National Aviation Underwriters from 1971 through February, 1988 and 
Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters from May, 1988 until 1992 
and stated his salary for the six years prior to trial. Page 14 of 
Appellant's Brief specifically provides "the court also found that Mr. 
Colburn with his education and experience as a high level executive 
in the insurance industry and an officer in the United States Navy had 
acquired qualification skills to be transferred to different or other 
fields of employment". Accordingly, there was not an omission as to 
Mr. Colburn's past employment. 
Transferability of Job Skills. The issue of transferability and 
marketability of job skills was also addressed as evidenced by the 
above quoted language. Further, page 15 of Appellant's Brief contains 
the actual dialogue between the court and Connie Romboy regarding the 
issue of transferability of job skills with a statement by Ms. Romboy 
that she specifically looked at two areas for transferability, those 
being the areas of marketing and public relations manager and 
management consultant. Appellant's Brief then cited Mrs. Romboy's 
testimony regarding the salary range for both a public relations 
manager and a management consultant. 
Employment with VEMCO or outside of Aviation Industry. Contrary 
to the allegations set forth in Respondent's Brief, Mr. Colburn was 
not offered the job of heading up the commercial department of VEMCO. 
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(p.3 supra) Further, paragraph 7 of Appellant's Statement of Facts 
and page 17 of Appellant's Brief refer to Mr. Colburn receiving job 
offers of $13,000 and $23,000 per year which were rejected. 
Failure to Consider other Career Opportunities Including a Pilot 
and other Areas of Financial Planning. Page 16-17 of Appellant's 
Brief specifically addresses Mrs. Romboy's testimony that Mr. Colburn 
"has job skills and education which could be transferred to other 
employment such as a co-pilot (average salary $28,000-$30,000)". 
However, Mr. Colburn testified he has not flown an airplane for 
fifteen years, does not currently have a valid medical, has eye sight 
problems, does not have an A.P.P. rating, and companies are not hiring 
50-year old pilots. (Tr. 164-166, 190). 
Appellant's Brief also included the prospect of Mr. Colburn 
working for another financial planner and Ms. Romboy's testimony 
relating to salaries for a beginning financial consultant. Page 17 
of Appellant's Brief provides: 
Mr. Colburn testified he could earn $10.00 per hour working 
for another financial planner and Connie Romboy testified 
that a beginning financial planning consultant would earn 
$28,000 per year nationally or $26,600 in the State of 
Utah. 
Mr. Colburn adequately marshalled the evidence relating to the 
issue of voluntary underemployment by addressing his job 
qualifications and work experience and the testimony of Connie Romboy 
relating to the transferability and marketability of skills he 
obtained through his past employment. Accordingly, Respondent's 
argument that Appellant's Brief fails to satisfactory marshall the 
evidence is not well founded. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Colburn made a prudent business decision to become a 
certified financial planner because it was the best long-term job 
opportunity available. Accordingly, he is not underemployed and 
underemployment is a statutory requirement before income can be 
imputed. Should the Court determine that Mr. Colburn is voluntarily 
underemployed, income should be imputed at a maximum of $26,600 per 
year which is the trial testimony regarding the starting salary for 
a financial planner. There was no evidence presented regarding job 
openings available to Mr. Colburn at a higher salary. 
The trial court clearly abused its discretion in awarding alimony 
whether or not income is imputed to Mr. Colburn. Alimony may only 
raise the standard of living of the receiving spouse until it is 
roughly equal to that of the paying spouse. As evidenced by the 
disproportionate expenses of the parties, Mrs. Colburn's standard of 
living is substantially higher than that of Mr. Colburn1s without an 
alimony award. 
Adequate evidence was introduced at trial to support Mr. 
Colburn fs contention that his Navy retirement is determined by a point 
system and the point system is the proper method to use in allocating 
his retirement benefits between the parties. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of December_^JL995. 
. Christiansen 
& CHRISTIANSEN, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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